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756 W .ARD V. JoNES [39 C.2d 
[L. A. No. 22092. In Bank. Oct. 24, 1952.] 
AILEEN MARY WARD et al., Appellants, v. A. B. JONES 
et al., Respondents. 
[1] Public Officers-Liability-Actions-Filing Claim as Condition 
Precedent.-Gov. Code, § 1981, making filing of a claim a 
prerequisite to recovery of damages for personal injuries 
resulting from negligence or carelessness of a public employer 
or employee, applies to actions for wrongful death, an heir 
of the deceased being a person injured within the meaning of 
such statute. 
[2] Id.-Liability-Actions-Pleading.-In wrongful death action 
against fellow employees of deceased painter employed by city, 
complaint states cause of action based on "negligence" within 
the meaning of Gov. Code, § 1981, although the word "wilful" 
appears in one allegation against one defendant, where the 
same acts are alleged to constitute negligence and carelessness 
on the part of all defendants. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County. William B. McKesson, Judge. Affirmed. 
Action for damages for wrongful death. Judgment of dis-
missal following order sustaining general demurrer to com-
plaint without leave to amend. Affirmed. 
Richard L. Mayers and Lawr~nce William Steinberg for 
Appellants. 
Hay L. Chesebro, City Attorney (Los Angeles), Gilmore 
'l'illman, Chief Assistant City Attorney, Wendell Mackay and 
A. L. Lawson, Deputy City Attorneys, for Respondents. 
SHENK, J.-This is an action for damages for wrongful 
death as authorized by section 377 of the Code of Civil Pro-
cedure. That section provides that "when the death of a 
person ... is caused by the wrongful act or neglect of an-
other, his heirs ... may maintain an action for damages 
against the person causing the death . . . '' 
[1] Death as result of injury as affecting requirement of notice 
of claim as condition of municipal liability, note, 64 A.L.R. 1059. 
See, also, Cal.Jur., Public Officers, § 88 et seq.; Am.Jur., Municipal 
Corporations, § 688. 
McK. Dig. Reference: [1, 2] Public Officers, § 66.1. 
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:I'he plaintiffs are the widow and minor children of Joseph 
T .. Ward, deceased. The complaint, later amended, was filed 
on March 29, 1949. The appeal is from a judgment of dis-
missal of the action following an order sustaining a general 
demurrer without leave to amend. 
The decedent was a painter employed in the Department 
of Water and Power of the City of l1os Angeles. On July 
12, 1948, he was a member of a crew of department employees 
then engaged in painting an electrical transmission line tower. 
This tower supported high tension wires carrying an elec-
trical potential of approximately 130,000 volts. While Ward 
and his fellow employees were engaged in the discharge 
of their departmental duties he was injured by coming in 
contact with a high tension wire and died two days later. 
The liability of the employer city was prescribed and limited 
by the death benefit provisions of workmen's compensation 
laws of the state, and the city is therefore not a party de-
fendant in this action. The defendants were fellow employees 
of the decedent. 
The complaint alleges that it was extremely hazardous 
for any painter to work on the transmission line towers when 
the wires were energized ; that reasonable care required: 
that the current be turned off while painters worked on the 
towers; that neither painters, planks, scaffolding nor rigging, 
except of the nonconducting quality, be permitted to come 
within 10 feet of the energized wires; that competent elec-
trical mechanics be stationed at all times between the wires 
and painters working on the towers, and that painters be re-
quired to wear safety belts while so working. 
It is also alleged that none of the foregoing precautions 
had been taken for a long period of time prior to the accident 
which caused Ward's death; that each of the defendants was 
aware of this fact, but in neglect and disregard of his duties 
.as an employee of the department "carelessly and negli-..__, 
gently" failed to take any steps to remedy the situation. ' 
The complaint then alleges that the electrical mechanic 
assigned to the job insisted that certain precautions be pro-
vided to protect the painters from the dangers of the high 
t'ension wires but that the defendant 0 'Connor "in wilful, 
11,egligent and reckless'' disregard of the safety of members 
of said crew, adopted the practice of working and did cause 
his painting crew to work in dangerous proximity to the high 
tension wires, without the protection of competent electrical 
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mechanics; that on the day of the fatal accident the deceased 
was a member of the painting crew that was "negligently 
directed by the defendants'' Williams and Phillips to paint 
the tower which was in dangerous proximity to the high ten-
sion wires . 
. A verified claim for damages stating the necessary informa-
tion was filed with the city clerk on October 8, 1948, by the 
plaintiff widow. The complaint does not allege that any claim 
for damages was presented to or served upon the defendants 
or any of them, and they received no actual notice that an 
action would be brought against them prior to the service 
of the complaint in this action. 
Section 1981 of the Government Code provides: "When-
ever it is claimed that any person has been injured or any 
property damaged as the result of the negligence or care-
lessness of any public officer or employee occurring during 
the course of his service or employment . . . within 90 days 
after the accident has occurred a verified claim for damages 
shall be presented in writip.g and filed with the officer or 
employe() and the clerk~ secretary of the legislative boay 
of the . . . municipality . . . '' 
It is the contention of the plaintiffs that section 1981 does 
_not apply to actions for wrongful death. It may not be denied 
.th.at if that section does apply to wrongful death cases a 
. verified claim must be presented to an employee sought to be 
charged within 90 days after the accident. In Veriddo v. 
Renaud, 35 Cal.2d 263, it was said, at page 265 [217 P.2d 
647], that by section 1981 the Legislature "has extended to 
public officers and employees, who incur liability in the per-
formance of government service, the protection of a claims 
statute and the privilege of having defended at public ex-
. pense those damage suits which are enumerated'' in the code. 
This court cited with approval the case of Huffaker v. Decker, 
77 Cal.App.2d 383 [175 P.2d 254], in which the defendant 
city employee was sued for damages allegedly caused by the 
· negligent driving of an automobile owned by the city and 
driven within the scope of the defendant's employment. It 
~vas held that the failure of the plaintiff to allege compliance 
with the claim provisions of section 1981 was fatal to his cause 
of action. 
The plaintiffs contend that the section contemplates only a 
. cl:iim on behalf of the person injured; that an heir under 
"the death sta,tute can in no sense be deemed to be the person 
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injured; that this concept is fortified by the use of the words 
"&fter the accident has occurred," and that thus the time 
of death as the time of the accident is excluded. 
[1] In an analogous situation this court has held that 
an heir of the deceased is a person injured within the terms 
~of the death statute. In Arellano v. City of Burbank, 13 Cal. 
2d 248 [89 P.2d 113], the liability of the municipality in a 
wrongful death case pursuant to the Public Liability Act 
of 1923 (Stats. 1923, p. 675; Gov. Code, § 53051), was sus-
tained. Section 2 of the act there under consideration pro-
vided that in certain cases municipalities should be liable for 
"~njuries" jo persons and property resulting from dangerous 
or defective condition of public streets. In holding that the 
statute authorized the city's liability for wrongful death this 
court at page 258 cited and quoted with approval from Ben-
nett v. Kings County, 124 Cal.App. 147, where it was said 
at page 150 [12 P.2d 47] : "Aside from the consideration of 
any other statutes, we are unable to see why the 'injuries to 
pers011s', referred to in this statute, do not include such in-
turies as may be caused to persons by reason of the death of 
others as well as injuries to persons directly involved not 
resulting in death. We think the injury suffered by these 
plaintiffs is covered by the statute and that the demurrer 
was properly overruled.'' 
A .different intent should not be attributed to the use of 
the same language in another section. An intent to include 
liability for injuries to persons and property flowing 
from wrongful death is read from the language in the section 
.imposing liability. An intent to exclude the obligation to file 
a claim due to such injuries may not therefore be read from 
the similar language in section 1981 of the Government Code. 
As used in that section the language likewise is plain and 
.sufficiently similar to warrant the conclusion that the Legis-
lature intended it to have the same meaning in each section. 
That language, referring to injuries to person and property, 
must be deemed to be all inclusive in both sections. 
The Arellano case was decided in 1939. That a sufficient 
claim is required in cases of wrongful death has been there-
after assumed. (See Cooper v. County of Butte, 17 Cal.App. 
2d 43 [61 P.2d 516]; Huey v. City of Los Angeles, 137 Cal. 
App. 48 [29 P.2d 918] ; Beeson v. City of Los Angeles, 115 
Cal.App. 122 [300 P. 993] .) With this construction placed 
upon the section the Legislature has not seen fit to change 
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the statutory requirements of presenting a claim in wrongful 
death cases. 
[2] It is contended by the plaintiff that section 1981 
applies only in cases of alleged "negligence and carelessness," 
that this complaint alleges something more in that the word 
''wilful'' appears in one allegation and thereby excludes the 
cause of action from the operation of the section. 'l'his con-
tention may not prevail. As above indicated it is alleged 
that by failing to take proper precautions to protect the 
painting crew the defendants "in violation, neglect and dis-
regard of their various duties and responsibilities as ofiicers 
and employees of said Department of Water and Power, 
carelessly and negligently failed to take any steps to remedy 
the same'' ; that the deceased was a member of a painting 
crew that "was negligently" directed by the defendants to 
paint one of the towers. As to the defendant A. J. 0 'Connor 
alone it is alleged that "in wilful, negligent and reckless" 
disregard of the lives and limbs of his crew, he had followed 
the practice of working and did cause his painting crew 
to work in dangerous proximity to said high tension wires; 
and that 0 'Connor's "practice" was with the knowledge, 
consent, authority and direction of his codefendants. Taking 
into consideration the complaint as a whole, wherein the same 
acts are alleged to constitute negligence and carelessness on 
the part of all of the defendants, the pleading states a cause 
of action based on negligence within the meaning of section 
1981 and would be sufiicient as such as against the general 
demurrer, but for the intervention of the claims statute. 
It is also urged that section 1981 is not applicable 
to this case because when death occurs as a result of the 
tortious act the time for presenting the claim is too uncertain. 
'l'he section provides that the claim must be presented within 
90 days after the ''accident has occurred.'' It is argued 
that the ''accident'' is the occurrence causing the injury and 
that the injured party may die more than 90 days after 
the event causing the injury, thus making compliance with 
the time element impossible. It is unnecessary here to deter-
mine whether the word "accident" as found in the statute 
should be held to refer to the event that gave rise to the in-
jury to the plaintiffs, namely, the death of the deceased, for 
the purpose of determining the commencement of the statu-
tory period. Since the plaintiffs filed no claim at all against 
the defendants, a determination in that respect would not 
resolve any issue in this case. 
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It is concluded that the attempted cause of action against 
the defendants is based on negligence; that section 1981 is 
applicable; and that failure to comply therewith is fatal. 
Under these circumstances it does not appear that the com-
plaint could be amended to state a cause of action. 
The judgment is affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Traynor, J., Schauer, J., and Spence, J., 
concurred. 
CARTER, J.-I dissent. 
There can be no doubt that the various statutes imposing 
liability on government agencies include liability for wrong-
ful death as well as injuries to persons and property and 
that they extend to cases where the injury is inflicted inten-
tionally, wilfully, or through gross negligence as well as 
negligence. The claim statutes, however, do not cover the 
wrongful death actions. The subject is ably discussed by 
Mr. Presiding Justice White of the District Court of Appeal, 
Second District, Division One, in an opinion prepared by him 
when this case was before that court, which I adopt as my 
dissent, as follows: 
''A general demurrer to their amended complaint (herein-
after referred to as the complaint) having been sustained 
without leave to amend, plaintiffs have appealed from the 
ensuing judgment of dismissal. The action is one for wrong-
ful death brought by the widow and minor children of 
Joseph 'r. Ward. The decedent met his death by coming in 
contact with a high tension electric transmission line while 
engaged as a painter in painting a tower at an electrical 
substation of the Department of Water and Power of the City 
of Los Angeles. The decedent was an employee of the depart-
ment and the defendants were fellow employees having vary-
ing degrees of supervision over or connection with the work 
of painting the tower. The complaint alleged, in substance, 
that it was extremely dangerous for a painter to work on the 
tower in the vicinity of the high-voltage wires, and that rea-
sonable care required that the current be turned off while 
:-mch work went on; that there be two competent electricians 
present at all times; that no painters, nor any equipment 
except of a nonconducting quality be permitted within 10 
feet of the wires while they were energized; that safety belts 
be used. It was charged that the defendants, in violation, 
neglect and disregard of their duties as officers and employees 
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of the department, carelessly and negligently failed to take 
such precautions; further that defendants 0 'Connor and Wil-
liams, as foreman and assistant foreman of the painting crew, 
caused an electrical mechanic to be removed from the job in 
order to expedite the work by omitting the precautions in-
sisted upon by the electrical mechanic and thereafter, 'in 
willful, negligent and reckless disregard of the lives and 
limbs of members of said crew, adopted the practice of work-
ing and did cause his painting crew to work in dangerous 
proximity to said high tension wires,' and 'to the knowledge 
and with the consent and authority and pursuant to the di-
rections of' the other defendants. 
''The demurrer was based upon the sole ground that the 
complaint failed to allege that the plaintiffs presented a veri-
fied claim to the defendants within 90 days from the date of 
the accident. The complaint in this connection contained 
the following allegation: 'That on October 8, 1948, plaintiff 
Aileen Mary \Vard filed a written verified claim for damages 
with the City of Los Angeles, State of California, by filing 
same with Walter Peterson, City Clerk of said City; that 
said claim for damages specified the names and addresses of 
the claimants, the nature of the damages and injuries, when 
and where the injuries occurred, and a description of the 
manner and nature of the accident and injuries.' 
''Section 1981 of the Government Code reads as follows : 
" 'Whenever it is claimed that any person has been injured 
or any property damaged as a result of the negligence or 
carelessness of any public officer or employee occurring dur-
ing the course of his service or employment or as a result of 
the dangerous or defective condition of any public property, 
alleged to be due to the negligence or carelessness of any officer 
or employee, within 90 days after the accident has occurred 
a verified claim for damages shall be presented in writing 
and filed with the officer or employee and the clerk or sec-
retary of the legislative body of the school district, county, 
or municipality, as the case may be. In the case of a State 
officer the claim shall be filed with the officer and the 
Governor.' 
"Appellants present three reasons why, they assert, the 
causes of action here involved do not come within the require-
ments of the aforesaid section 1981: 1. That an action for 
wrongful death is not included within the wording of the sec-
tion, which refers only to situations where 'it is claimed 
that any person has been injured or any property damaged'; 
2. That the section by its terms does not include cases involv-
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ing wilful misconduct, appellants here contending that they 
have set forth a cause of action for wilful misconduct rather 
than mere negligence ; and 3. That the statute should not be 
construed to include an action by an injured employee against 
a fellow employee. · 
''.As a fourth ground of reversal, appellants assert that 
even though section 1981 should be held applicable in the in-
stant action, their filing of a claim with the city clerk of the 
city of Los .Angeles should be held to constitute substantial 
compliance. 
'' 'rhe majority view of the courts of other jurisdictions as 
reflected in cases we consider as exceptionally well reasoned, 
is that statutes containing language similar to that involved 
in the section here under consideration do not apply to an 
actim1 for wrongful death. The language of the Supreme 
Court of Missouri in Glasgow v. City of St. Joseph (1944), 
353 Mo. 740, 748 [184 S.W.2d 412, 416], is illustrative: 'Un-
less actions for death by wrongful act, are explicitly included, 
it is generally held that like statutory provisions do not apply 
to an action for wrongful death. This is especially so where, 
as in Missouri' (and as in California), 'the wrongful death 
action is considered a new cause of action, first springing into 
existence at the time of death.' (Citing 25 C.J.S., p. 1102, 
§ 30, subsection a; 38 .Am.Jur., p. 392, § 688; 6 McQuillin, 
Municipal Corporations, p. 1285, § 2890, n. 12; Annotation, 
64 .A.L.R. 1059.) 
"The case of Spangler's Administrator v. City of Middles-
bm·o ( 1945), 301 Ky. 237 [191 S.W.2d 414], involved a statute 
providing that 'No action shall be maintained against any 
city . . . unless notice . . . be filed within ninety days of 
the occurrence for which damage is claimed. . . . ' The court 
there pointed out that where an injured party dies, the 
usual necessity for prompt examination to determine exact ex-
tent of injuries is obviated and the coroner's inquest pro-
vides the city with ample notice for the purpose of elimi-
nating for the future the dangerous condition which caused 
the death. But further, as pointed out by the Kentucky 
court, the notice is required to be filed within 90 days of the 
'occurrence' for which damages are claimed. The California 
statute uses the word 'accident.' Clearly, so far as an action 
for personal injuries is concerned, the words 'occurrence' 
and 'accident' mean the same thing-the incident or event 
causing the personal injuries, such as the incident of a col-
lision of automobiles, the incident of falling into an excava-
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tion, etc.) As stated in the last cited case, if it were held 
that notice were necessary to the maintenance of an action 
for wrongful death, the action would be barred where the 
'injury '--that is the 'accident' or 'occurrence' occurred more 
than 90 days before death. 
''The language of the Suprerne Court of Vermont in Bige-
low v. Town of St. Johnsbury (1918), 92 Vt. 423 [105 A. 34], 
is here appropf'iate: 'It is argued that ... persons finan-
cially injured through the death of their next of kin must 
give notice the same as they would be required to give if they 
were themselves physically injured. The absurdity of such 
a construction is manifest from its logical result. If a per-
son injured is, in consequence thereof, bereft of his reason, 
and the injuries result in his death 21 days after the occur-
rence of such injury, no action can be held or maintained, 
under the statute, for the benefit of the next of kin, because 
notice was not given within 20 days of the time of the injury, 
during all which time the injured person was yet alive. An 
absurd purpose is not to be attributed to the lawmakers, and 
a construction leading to an absurd consequence must always 
be avoided.' 
''Another Vermont case illustrative of the difficulties that 
would be involved were the statute held applicable is Eames 
v. Town of Brattleboro (1882), 54 Vt. 471, where the person 
injured died within half an hour after the accident. Re-
covery was sought on behalf of two minor daughters, no claim 
or notice having been filed. The court said: 'We think there 
is no room for doubt that no notice was required in this 
case. The language is plain and the effect of it unmistak-
able. The "person injured", as used in the proviso, refers 
to the person injured in the accident, not to the person in-
jured pecuniarily, as a result of the accident.' 
'' vVe will refer further to the meaning in section 1981 of 
the words 'whenever it is claimed that any person has been 
injured' in discussing respondents' contentions with respect 
to the applicability of the statute. 
''Other cases holding typical claims statutes to be inappli-
cable to wrongful death actions, many involving statutes con-
taining much broader language than that involved in the 
instant case, are D1~ariotti v. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. (1914), 
262 Mo. 1 [170 S.W. 865] ; Nesbit v. City of Topeka (1912), 
87 Kan. 394 [124 P. 166, 40 L.R.A. N.S. 749]; Orth v. Bel-
grade (1902), 87 Minn. 237 [91 N.W. 843]; Senecal v. City of 
West St. Pattl (1910), 111 Minn. 253 [126 N.W. 826]; Parish 
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v. Eden (1885), 62 Wis. 272 [22 N.W. 399]; McKeigue v. 
City of Janewille (1887), 68 Wis. 50 [31 N.W. 298]; Laconte 
v. City of Kenosha (1912), 149 Wis. 343 [135 N.W. 843]; 
Knight v. Town of Haverhill (1915), 77 N.H. 487 [93 A. 663]; 
Perkins v. Oxford (1877), 66 lVfe. 545; Prouty v. City of Chi-
cago (1911), 250 Ill. 222 [95 N.E. 147]; Devine v. City of 
Chicago (1911), 166 Ill.App. 17. 
''Respondents urge that the language 'person . . . injured' 
includes injury resulting from the wrongful death of an-
other, and that this view is supported by the interpretations, 
expressed or assumed, of similar language in related statutes, 
in decisions of the courts of this state. In this connection, it is 
said that the various statutes1 on the subject of the liability 
of cities, public agencies, and their officers, and the filing of 
claims therefor, 'must all be read together and so construed, 
the liability of a city or its agents must be determined and 
the procedure therein set forth must be followed.' (Yonker 
v. City of San Gab1·iel, 23 Cal.App.2d 556 [73 P.2d 623]. 
See also Shannon v. Fleishhacker, 116 Cal.App. 258 [2 P.2d 
835]; Douglass v. City of Los Angeles, 5 Cal.2d 123 [53 P.2d 
353] ; Ansell v. City of San Diego, 35 Cal.2d 76 [216 P.2d 455] ; 
Jackson v. City of Santa Monica, 13 Cal.App.2d 376 [57 P.2d 
226]; Tyree v. City of Los Angeles, 92 Cal.App.2d 182 [206 
P.2d 912].) 
"Section 53051 of the Government Code (formerly Stats. 
1923, p. 675) provides that counties, municipalities and school 
districts 'shall be liable for injuries to persons and prop-
erty .... ' In Arellano v. City of Bttrbank, 13 Cal.2d 248 
[ 89 P .2d 113], it was expressly held that 'injuries to persons' 
referred to in the statute, include such injuries as may be 
caused to persons by reason of the death of others. Further 
it is pointed out by respondents, in such cases as Douglass v. 
City of Los Angeles, 5 Cal.2c1123 [53 P.2d 353], and Spencer 
v. City of Calipatria, 9 Cal.App.2d 267 [49 P.2d 320], it was 
held that a recovery could not be had under the provisions 
of section 53051 of the Government Code unless a claim is 
filed as required by section 53052 of the same code, which lat-
"
1 Act of 1923 (Stats. 1923, p. 675), making cities and other public 
agencies liable for negligence in certain instances. Now substantially 
incorporated in section 53051, Government Code. 
"Act of 1919 (Stats. 1919, p. 756), relating to liability of officers 
of cities and other public agencies. Now incorporated in section 1953, 
Government Code. · 
''Act of 1931 (Stats. 1931, p. 2475), requiring filing of claims with 
clerk of the legislative body of a city or public agency. Now section 
53052, Government Code.'' 
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ter section provides (as does section 1981), 'Whenever it is 
claimed that a person has been injured . . . a . . . claim 
for damages shall be ... filed .... ' However, no case has 
been found in which it has been squarely held that a claim 
must be filed under section 53052 in a death action arising 
under section 53051. Respondents urge that since these per-
tinent statutes (Gov. Code, § § 1981, 1953, 53051 and 53052) 
were reenacted as part of the Government Code after the deci-
sion in Arellano v. City of Burbank, supra, it must be pre-
sumed that the Legislature intended them to apply to death 
cases. 
"The cases of Dillard v. County of Kern, 23 Cal.2d 271 [144 
P.2d 365, 150 A.L.R. 1048], and Shannon v. Fleishhacker, 116 
Cal.App. 258 [2 P.2d 835], are of no particular assistance in 
the solution of the question here presented. The former case 
involved section 4075 of the Political Code, which required 
that 'all claims' against a county should be presented as 
therein provided, while in the latter case the court was con-
cerned with whether the plaintiff had proved the elements 
of liability required under the statute then in force ( Stats. 
1919, p. 756; 2 Deering's Gen. Laws, Act 5618). The same 
is true with reference to cases involving wrongful death 
actions against the city of Los Angeles (Beeson v. City of Los 
Angeles, 115 Cal.App. 122 [300 P. 993] ; Htley v. City of Los 
Angeles, 137 Cal.App. 48 [29 P.2d 918]), as these cases in-
volv~d a charter provision that 'No suit shall be brought on 
any claim . . . · until a demand for the same has been pre-
sented .... ' 
''Thus, while a statute imposing liability for 'injuries to 
persons' has been construed to include liability for wrongful 
death (Arellano v. City of Burbank, supra, and cases cited), 
and while it has been sometimes assumed that a statute 
requiring the filing of a claim as a prerequisite to suit in-
cludes a suit for wrongful death, in no case has it been held 
that the provisions of section 1981, requiring the filing of a 
claim 'whenever it is claimed that any person has been in-
jured ... within 90 days after the accident has occurred' 
apply to a wrongful death situation. Nor does it necessarily 
follow that because the phrase 'injuries to persons' as used 
in a statute imposing liability has been construed to include 
wrongful death, the language of section 1981 should be con-
strued to require the filing of a claim as a prerequisite to the 
maintenance of an action for wrongful death. 
"It is manifest from the plain wording of section 1981 
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that it was the intention of the Legislature to qualify the 
common law right of action against the negligent person by 
requiring the filing of a verified claim only in the event the 
injured person claims that he has been injured as a result 
of the negligence of a public employee occurring during the 
course of the latter's public employment. Had it been the 
intention of the Legislature to extend the provisions of this 
section to another, new and different cause of action which 
comes into existence at the time of death of the injured 
person, appropriate language could, and no doubt would, have 
been used. Courts should not, under the guise of judicial 
interpretation, attempt to add to or detract from the legis-
lative intent as expressed in the words of a statute. This is 
especially true when, as the Supreme Court said in the recent 
case of Stewart v. McCollister, 37 Cal.2d 203, 207 [231 P.2d 
48], 'The several claims statutes and charter provisions pre-
scribing varying requirements concerning the length of time 
for the filing of verified claims, the contents thereof, and the 
manner of filing or presentation may well be said to have 
become traps for the unwary. No additional trap sbould be 
added by an unwarranted construction of said section 1981.' 
We are unwilling to give our imprimatur to a strained con-
struction of the section by applying it to a cause of action 
which, from a reading of the section's terms, is not included 
within its purview. 
''In view of the foregoing conclusion at which we have 
arrived, we deem it unnecessary to discuss or decide other 
points made and issues raised upon this appeal. 
''The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded with 
directions to the court below to overrule the demurrer and 
try the cause upon the merits." 
For the reasons above stated I would reverse the judgment. 
EDMONDS, J.-I am in agreement with the conclusions 
of the District Court of Appeal that a cause of action for 
wrongful death does not come within the purview of the 
claim statute and the judgment should be reversed. The 
reasoning of that court made unnecessary discussion of other 
questions presented by the parties. However, the contrary 
conclusion now reached upon the applicability of the statute 
to a cause of action for wrongful death requires considera-
tion of the contention that the statute also is inapplicable to 
a cause of action based upon wanton and reckless miscon-
duct. The question should not be evaded upon the ground 
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that the complaint states a cause of action for negligence 
alone and could not be amended to state one for wanton 
and reckless misconduct. 
As I read the complaint, the opinion does not accurately 
summarize the plaintiffs' allegations. According to the plead-
ing, it was extremely dangerous for a painter to work on the 
towers in the vicinity of ''hot wires'' and certain specialized 
safety precautions were required. None of these precautions 
was observed. The electrical mechanic assigned to the job 
''insisted on certain necessary precautions . . . which if taken 
would somewhat slow down the painting job and increase its 
costs." O'Connor, the complaint continues, "for the pur-
pose of being able to proceed with said job with such expedi-
tion and cost as he desired, caused the removal of said Elec-
trical Mechanic from the job, and thereafter, in willful, neg-
ligent and reckless disregard of the lives and limbs of mem-
bers of said crew, adopted the practice of working and did 
cause his painting crew to work in dangerous proximity to 
said high tension wires, without the aforesaid protection of 
competerrt Electrical Mechanics, to the knowledge and with 
the consent and authority and pursuant to the directions'' of 
the other defendants. 
The allegations of the complaint are sufficient to state a 
cause of action for wanton and reckless misconduct. ''A tort 
having some of the characteristics of both negligence and 
willfulness occurs when a person with no intent to cause 
harm intentionally performs an act so unreasonable and 
dangerous that he knows, or should know, it is highly 
probable that harm will result. (Rest. Torts, § 500 et seq.; 
Prosser, Torts, pp. 260, 261.) · Such a tort has been la-
beled 'willful negligence,' 'wanton and willful negligence,' 
'wanton and willful misconduct,' and even 'gross negli-
gence.' It is most accurately designated as wanton and 
reckless misconduct. It involves no intention, as does will-
ful misconduct, to do harm, and it differs from negligence in 
that it does involve an intention to perform an act that the 
actor knows, or should know, will very probably cause harm. 
(Citations.) Wanton and reckless misconduct is more closely 
akin to willful misconduct than to negligence, and it has most 
of the legal consequences of willful misconduct. Thus, it jus-
tifies an award of punitive damages, and contributory negli-
gence by the plaintiff is not a defense." (Donnelly v. South-
ern Pac. Co., 18 Cal.2d 863, 869-870 [118 P.2d 465] .) 
As examples of conduct which is in reckless disregard of 
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the safety of another, the Donnelly case cites New York Cen-
tral R. R. Co. v. Mohney, 252 U.S. 152 [ 40 S.Ct. 287, 64 L.Ed. 
502], involving a collision between railroad trains after the 
engineer of one had run his train past two separate danger 
signals. Another example given is the operation of a bus over 
a dangerous railroad crossing at a rate of 55 to 60 miles 
per hour. (Virgin1:a Beach Bus Line v. Campbell, 73 F.2d 
97.) "Such conduct constitutes more than negligence. It 
is a dangerous act performed intentionally with the knowl-
edge that it will probably cause harm." (Donnelly v. Sottth-
ern Pac. Co., supra, p. 870.) 
In Vega Aircraft v. Indttstrial Ace. Com., 27 Cal.2d 529, 
[ 165 P .2d 665], a finding of "serious and wilful misconduct 
of the employer" by the commission was upheld on evidence 
which showed a failure by supervisory employees to take the 
proper safety precautions in conducting experimental work 
of an extremely dangerous nature. The court said: ''Serious 
and wilful misconduct is conduct which the employer knew, 
or should have known, was likely to result in serious injury 
or which evinced reckless disregard for the safety of the 
employe." (Pp. 533-534.) 
''Serious and willful misconduct is conduct that the em-
ployer knew, or should have known, was likely to cause seri-
ous injury, or conduct that evinces a reckless disregard for 
the safety of others. (Citations.) It has been held repeatedly 
that the employment of workmen under dangerous conditions 
that can be guarded against constitutes a reckless disregard 
for their safety. (Citations.) The test under these cases 
is whether the employer knowingly or willfully committed 
an act that he knew or should have known was likely to cause 
harm to his employee." (Parkhttrst v. Industrial Ace. Com., 
20 Cal.2d 826, 829-830 [129 P.2d 113] ; Hatheway v. Indus-
trial Ace. Corn., 13 Cal.2d 377, 381 [90 P.2d 68] .) 
The complaint in this case alleges all of the elements neces-
sary to constitute the tort of ''wanton and reckless miscon-
duct," as it is called in the Donnelly case, supra, or of "wil-
ful misconduct,'' the designation more generally applied to 
it in the decisions and statutes. (Rest., Torts, § 500, special 
note.) Here the defendants, it is alleged, knew the danger 
and deliberately failed to provide, or even removed, the proper 
safety procedures. This is far more than a simple allegation 
of negligence although negligence may be included within the 
scope of the pleading. If the facts alleged are proved, a judg-
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ment based upon wanton and reckless misconduct would be 
warranted. The situation is not one where the plaintiffs at-
tempt to evade the claim statute by formally alleging that 
negligent acts also were "wilful." They allege all of the facts 
necessary to support a finding of wilful misconduct. This be-
lies the implication of the majority opinion that the allega-
tion of wilfullness was mere formalism. 
Even if it may correctly be concluded that the complaint 
states a canse of action for negligence only, it is obvious 
from the facts alleged that the plaintiffs could state a cause 
of action for wanton and reckless misconduct. "Unless it is 
clear that a complaint does not state a cause of action and can-
not be so amended as to obviate the objections thereto it is 
error to refuse permission to amend." (Hillman v. Hillman 
Land Co., 81 Cal..App.2d 174, 181 [183 P.2d 730]; People v. 
Tur·lock Home Tel. & Tel. Co., 200 Cal. 546, 550 [253 P. 1108] ; 
Payne v. Baehr, 153 Cal. 441, 447-448 [95 P. 895] ; Photochart 
v. Del Riccio, 94 Cal.App.2d 315,319 [210 P.2d 547].) Under 
the circumstances, the general demurrer should not have been 
sustained without leave to amend. 
By basing the judgment upon the conclusion that the com-
plaint states a cause of action for negligence only, the ma-
jority implicitly concede that wilful misconduct is not in-
cluded within the provisions of section 1981 of the Government 
Code. No other interpretation of the statute is possible. By 
its express terms, it applies only to ''negligence or careless-
ness." "Wilful misconduct" is not included. 
Statutes in derogation of the common law will be strictly 
construed. (McCann v. Hoffman, 9 Cal.2d 279, 282 [70 P.2d 
909] ; Gallet v. Alioto, 210 Cal. 65, 70 [290 P. 438] .) At 
common law, the public employee was liable for his tortious 
act. (Perkins v. Blauth, 163 Cal. 782, 789 [127 P. 50] ; Doeg 
v. Cook, 126 Cal. 213, 216-217 [58 P. 707, 77 Am.St.Rep. 
171]; cf. Elliott v. County of Los Angeles, 183 Cal. 472, 474 
[191 P. 899] ; Moore v. Burton, 75 Cal.App. 395, 401 [242 P. 
902] .) Government Code, section 1981, places a procedural 
requirement upon the maintenance of the previously existing 
cause of action. (Veriddo v. Renaud, 35 Cal.2d 263, 266 
[217 P.2d 647]; Huffaker v. Decker, 77 Cal.App.2d 383, 389 
[175 P.2d 254].) This limitation upon the common law cause 
of action should be strictly construed and not extended 
to causes of action other than those specifically encompassed 
within the terms of the statute. 
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This court consistently ,has followed the general rule that 
"wilful misconduct" is much more than "negligence." It 
is the intentional doing of an act, rather than failure to per-
form a duty. The distinction is basic, not merely technical. 
The two types of conduct are essentially different. "Wilful 
misconduct'' is not ''negligence.'' As recently as Benton v. 
Sloss, 38 Cal.2d 399, 403 [240 P.2d 575], the court, interpret-
ing Vehicle Code sections 402 and 403, distinguished between 
"negligence" and "wilful misconduct," holding that the 
latter is not included within the former. 
The Benton case relies upon Weber v. Pinyan, 9 Cal.2d 
226 [70 P.2d 183, 112 A.L.R. 407], which reviews at length 
the cases distinguishing the two separate types of conduct. 
There, the court was faced with the question whether "wilful 
misconduct" in section 141% of the Vehicle Act (now Veh. 
Code, § 403) is the same as "negligence" in section 1714% 
of the Civil Code (now Veh. Code, § 402). It held that the 
two types of conduct were different. In reaching its con-
clusion, it relied upon cases drawing the distinction in the 
general field of tort law as well as upon decisions construing 
the motor vehicle statutes. To emphasize its point that the 
Legislature understood the difference, it mentioned in passing 
the use of both "negligence" and "wilful misconduct" in 
Vehicle Code, section 352, relating to liability for the acts 
of a minor. 
Civil Code, section 1714, draws the distinction between 
the two types of conduct by separately describing acts giving 
rise to liability. It provides : "Everyone is responsible, not 
only for the result of his willful acts, but also for an injury 
occasioned to another by his want of ordinary care or skill in 
the management of his property or person, except so far as 
the latter has, willfully or by want of ordinary care, brought 
the injury upon himself .... " 
Donnelly v. Southern Pac. Co., supra, provides a graphic 
explanation of the difference between negligence and wilful 
misconduct and of the varying degrees of negligence. The 
question involved was whether certain actions constituted 
wilful misconduct, the only basis upon which liability could 
be predicated, or whether they were merely negligence, even 
though of a high degree. The court said: "Negligence is an 
unintentional tort, a failure to exercise the degree of care 
in a given situation that a reasonable man under similar cir-
cumstances would exercise to protect others from harm. 
(Citations.) A negligent person has no desire to cause the 
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harm that results from his carelessness (citation), and he 
must be distinguished from a person guilty of willful mis-
conduct, such as assault and battery, who intends to cause 
harm. (Citation.) Willfulness and negligence are contradic-
tory terms. (Citations.) If conduct is negligent, it is not 
willful; if it is willful, it is not negligence." (P. 869.) Other-
wise stated, the conduct being considered, said the court, may 
have been ''gross'' under the California rule, but it con-
stituted negligence and not wanton and reckless misconduct. 
Prior to the adoption of chapter 1168, Statutes of 1931, 
upon which section 1981 is based, the distinction between 
"negligence" and "wilful misconduct" had been clearly 
drawn by the courts. In MaLone v. Clemow, 111 Cal.App. 13 
[295 P. 70], it was said: "We should not confuse 'gross 
negligence' with 'willful misconduct,' because there is a clear 
distinction between the two terms." (P. 17.) Reviewing the 
authorities, the court held that "whenever the element of 
knowledge and wilfulness enters into the act, it ceases to be 
negligence, and becomes at least 'willful misconduct,' and this 
is true no matter what degree of negligence is being con-
sidered." (P. 17.) 
"When the scope and meaning of words or phrases in a 
statute have been repeatedly interpreted by the courts, there 
is some indication that the use of them in a subsequent statute 
in a similar setting carries with it a like construction.'' 
(Perry v. Jordan, 34 Cal.2d 87, 93 [207 P.2d 47]; City of 
Long Beach v. Payne, 3 Cal.2d 184, 191 [44 P.2d 305].) The 
frequent definitions of "negligence" as distinguished from 
"wilful misconduct," and the application of the definition to 
liability "resulting from negligence" in section 17141~ of 
the Civil Code (now Veh. Code, § 402,) indicate a legislative 
intent to give a similar construction to "as a result of the 
negligence'' in section 1981. 
Therefore, even if it may correctly be held that a cause 
of action for wrongful death is included within the terms of 
the statute, the demurrer was sustained improperly. The 
complaint is based upon a cause of action for wanton and 
recklf'ss misconduct, for which no claim is required. 
For this reason, as well as those stated by the District 
Court of Appeal, I would reverse the judgment. 
Appellants' petition for a rehearing was denied November 
20. 1952. Edmonds, J .. and Carter, J., were of the opinion 
that the petition should be granted. 
